

OFFICIAL



**National Police Chiefs' Council (NPCC)
Protest Operational Advice Document
Version 1.0**

Contents

Foreword

Introduction

 This document's scope

 Aim

Role of the police

Striking a balance

 A focus on Human Rights

 When can public authorities interfere with Human Rights?

 Broader understanding

 Impact of long-term protest

Information systems and processes

 Information management

 Local context

 National context

 Historical context

 Social media/online content

Working with stakeholders

 Protestors

 Public authorities

 Subject of protest

 The individual

 Commercial business

 Public authorities / state

 Other protest groups

 Community

Command, planning and tactics

 Command

 Planning

 Tactics

Vulnerability at protests

Protective security

Costs

 Financial control and governance

 External liaison

Appendix A – National contacts

Appendix B – Human Rights articles and Case Law

Glossary

Foreword

“Protest has played a crucial part in UK history and continues to do so. In some instances, it’s been instrumental in bringing about significant change, including the advancement of civil rights, social justice and in influencing national policy. As such, it has served to shape the society we live in today.

“This document has been written for use by Public Order Public Safety Commanders and Advisors. It represents advancement in learning from policing protests since 2009 and reflects a growing awareness of the police’s responsibilities to all those involved in and affected by protest.

“Because of this the NPCC have worked with College of Policing to ensure that all existing commanders and advisors will be made aware of it through their annual mandatory training in 2019/2020. Future courses, for new commanders and advisors, will also be informed by the approach detailed within the document.

“I’m confident that together with national guidance, this document will better inform and support local command decision making in this important area of our work.”



DCC Pippa Mills

Pippa Mills

National Police Chiefs’ Council Protest Lead

Introduction

Our society cherishes the individual's right to protest in a peaceful way – even when such views are unpopular or controversial.

Introduction

It is widely recognised that our society cherishes the individual's right to protest in a peaceful way. The right to protest extends to expression of views that may be considered by some to be unpopular or controversial. At times, protests can result in disruption and even conflict. Police must remain cognisant of the importance of protest within a democratic society. They must however be able to respond appropriately when protest falls outside what is likely to be considered reasonable, for a balance to be struck between competing Human Rights.

The British Police Service has a long history of working with stakeholders in protest. In determining its policing response to protest over nearly two hundred years, it has gained much experience. This was acknowledged in [Adapting to Protest \(HMIC 2009\)](#) and [Nurturing the British Policing Model \(HMIC 2009\)](#).

As a result of these reports' recommendations, the National Police Public Order Training Curriculum (NPPOTC) was updated to include a greater focus on the freedoms enshrined in the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). This means that police trained under the curriculum are now better able to make informed decisions when dealing with protest.

The proliferation of social media and the ability for people to move easily across the country has changed the nature of protest and resulted in protestors travelling to multiple force areas. This document supports a consistent approach at a national level enabling individual Police Forces to develop proportionate policing operations when dealing with those engaged in and affected by protest.

In recent years, many forces have had experience in dealing with significant, often protracted incidents of disruptive protest. Achieving a balance between the rights of protestors and those of lawful business and other stakeholders is recognised as challenging. The approach advocated throughout this document has been based on key operational learning and case law.

The nature of modern protest has evolved, and the police response to it must adapt if a fair, proportionate approach is to be achieved. In determining a fair approach, police commanders need to assess each protest's unique nature, its potential impact on others and upon wider society. It must be recognised that an individual's right to protest cannot be at the expense of all others' rights, and the law accounts for this. This document will explore Striking the Balance in terms of Human Rights.

While there is huge variance in the scale and nature of protests, this document seeks to further professionalise the police response and in doing so, improve public perceptions of legitimacy. This national approach to policing protest supports services in upholding the principle of [policing by consent](#).

The NPCC requires that all Public Order Public Safety Commanders (POPS Commanders) and Public Order Public Safety Advisors (POPSAs) have a working knowledge of this document's contents.

Advance notification or intelligence indicating a protest will take place allows fuller consideration of the document during the planning stages of such operations.

This document's scope

This document should be considered for all instances of public protest. These may include (by no means an exhaustive nor hierarchical list):

- Political.
- Religious.
- Environmental.
- Animal Rights.
- Single issue.

UK domestic legislation includes some separate provisions for industrial action and trade unions under the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 ([although s.241](#) concerns general application). When dealing with such incidents police should familiarise themselves with the relevant requirements placed on both employers and employees under the Act. As with all primary and subordinate legislation it should be read and given effect in a way which is compatible with the ECHR 'so far as it is possible to do so' (held to mean 'unless it is plainly impossible') under s.3 (1) of the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA).

This document has been written in response to feedback and organisational learning from recent

protests. They have presented challenges in terms of the welfare of those engaged in the protest, to the subjects of the protest, the police and the wider community. These operations have placed significant demand on those police forces involved over sustained periods, and consequently have highlighted the need to improve existing working practices during the planning, operational, and post-event phase.

Rather than simply being confined to what might be considered 'long-term protest', the advice and guidance detailed in this document provides a point of reference to POPS Commanders and Advisors involved in the policing of protest, from which they can quickly identify those areas most relevant.

This document signposts relevant Authorised Professional Practice (APP), NPCC advice and other source documents. It makes use of hyperlinks to direct readers to current versions of guidance and avoid, where possible, duplicating content.

Aim

This document has been written for use by operationally competent POPS Commanders and POPsAs and aims to:

- Support consistency of decision-making and engagement with stakeholders.
- Support forces in relation to policing protest and balancing the rights of those involved.
- Sign-post guidance, legislation, key legal decisions, policies and practice which may assist in the policing of protest, thereby preventing or reducing crime, disorder and/or terrorism to support overall public safety.

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Role of the police

**A balanced, impartial approach towards
all those involved in or affected by
protest.**

Role of the police

Policing protests can be very challenging and requires a balanced and impartial approach towards all those involved in or affected by protest that is consistent with [The Code of Ethics](#), Human Rights law and other domestic legislation.

APP identifies [two duties](#) associated with the policing of protest. Broadly these require that the police must:

- not prevent, hinder or restrict peaceful assembly
- in certain circumstances, take reasonable steps to protect those who want to exercise their rights peacefully.

Exceptions to the former negative duty exist and Human Rights Law should always be considered in conjunction with other domestic legislation.

These duties do however reaffirm a recognised 'starting point' for policing public protest: the presumption in favour of peaceful assembly under Article 11 of the ECHR. This approach is illustrated in a [flow chart](#) published by HMIC.

Naturally, the overall [role of the police](#) extends far beyond these two duties and at times may appear in direct conflict with them. The challenge for the police is to, where appropriate, strike a balance in what are often incredibly complex situations.


The scope of the role and responsibilities of the police will vary between protests. This will be influenced by an information and intelligence picture, which informs a detailed threat assessment.

The NPCC consider this document should assist in informing any decision by individual chief officers as to whether police are deployed in relation to protests.

Any requirement for police to be deployed in relation to protests may also vary over the course of the policing operation.

In view of these variations, it is essential that the decision-making process is consistent, auditable and transparent if it is to withstand scrutiny. Police should use the [National Decision Model](#) (NDM) to support them in this. This will be further supported by an appropriately trained and experienced [command structure](#).

Striking the balance



The broader consideration of human rights law reflects a growing awareness of the police's responsibilities to all those involved in and affected by protest.

Striking the balance

A focus on Human Rights

A key element of the police's response to the recommendations in [Adapting to Protest - Nurturing the British Model of Policing](#) was a review of the National Police Public Order Training Curriculum (NPPOTC). One element of that review centred on an increased focus on the importance of [Articles 10 and 11](#) when policing protests. In the years since the report's publication, the revised training has supported the police in considering their duties under the ECHR in relation to protest in a more careful and structured way.

Following the publication of 'Adapting to Protest' the police interpretation of any limitation or restriction on protest has been based on public safety and the prevention of crime and disorder. Key learning from that document has since been incorporated into [APP](#). Emphasis has been, that provided the intentions of the organisers of a protest were peaceful, the police should fulfil their positive obligations to protect the protesters' rights under Article 11 and their negative obligation not to interfere, other than where necessary to do so (see above).

The interpretation of 'peaceful' has traditionally been non-violent, and historically police training has supported this. The threshold for any degree of police interference/restriction should not be solely linked with the criteria required for restrictions under Sections [12 and 14 of the Public Order Act 1986](#). Any intervention (including that achieved consensually

and/or following negotiation) should be supported by a rationale detailing the 'need' for police interference.

Recognising that protest inherently involves multiple stakeholders, each with at times competing and conflicting Human Rights, the police must seek to strike a balance when determining their approach. This balance will need to take account of all stakeholders' rights, may not always be equitable and must be based on threat and risk. Properly understood, Human Rights law will often assist the police in reaching a proportionate and evidenced rationale for taking (or equally, not taking) action in any given circumstance.

The use of the [Risk Principles, NDM](#) and a sound understanding of where and how Human Rights should be considered within the model will support police decision making. Knowledge of the ECHR goes beyond powers and policies and assists with ethical decision making. While domestic legislation informs and provides the police with the powers available to them, the ECHR helps in deciding whether, and how, they should use those powers.

Section 3 of the HRA requires officers to read and give effect to primary and subordinate legislation in a way which is compatible with Convention rights 'so far as it is possible to do so' (held to mean 'unless it is plainly impossible'). Further, in order to apply domestic legislation that is compatible with Convention rights, the police need to have a good knowledge of the Articles and how they may apply in various scenarios.

This section details some of the key [European Court of Human Rights](#) (ECtHR) cases in relation to policing protest, which are also listed in the Appendix B.

The obligation on the police to act in accordance with the ECHR is outlined in [Section 6 of the HRA](#). Section 6 states that it is 'unlawful for a public authority to act in a way which is incompatible with a Convention right'. Importantly for the purposes of the ECHR, the word 'act' also includes inaction. This binds the police to comply with the ECHR. As well as knowledge of all the relevant Articles, all police should be aware in general terms of the obligations the ECHR creates, and the common scenarios where the exercise of police powers engages those rights.

When can public authorities interfere with rights?

There will be occasions where public authorities can, and in some cases, should take action that both engages and limits or interferes with an individual's rights.

There is an important difference between:

1. interference by a protestor in the rights of others which is an unintended consequence of the exercise of ECHR rights (even if such disruption is serious and inevitable) and
2. conduct where the aim or intention is the destruction of the rights of others.

As a starting point, the public authority must identify whether it is considering restricting a person's activity or conduct because it is necessary in order to strike a balance with the rights of others. Or is the situation one where the conduct falls **outside** the protection

afforded under the ECHR, because the conduct itself is aimed at the destruction of the rights and freedoms of others.

In the first scenario (1) the rights of the protestors must still be upheld, as far as it is possible to do so while still striking a balance. In the second scenario (2), the public authority may prevent such activity; as it may be under an obligation to do so.

Where the conduct is a legitimate exercise of a Convention right, any limitation/interference must meet the threefold test in that it must be:

1. prescribed by law
2. in pursuit of a legitimate aim
3. necessary in a democratic society.

For Articles 8-11, legitimate aims are:

1. national security, territorial integrity or public safety
2. prevention of disorder or crime
3. protection of health or morals
4. protection of the reputation or rights of others.

Often the impact of protest action upon others will be such that it requires careful consideration to determine what is likely to constitute a proportionate response that balances the rights of the protestors against the rights of those affected by their actions.

In other instances, the behaviour of individuals will clearly fall outside the scope of freedom of expression, as covered under Article 10 of the ECHR.

Where, giving full weight to the principle that Article 10 protection extends to behaviour which may shock, offend, disturb or irritate, the police are nevertheless

of the view that if the conduct actually amounts to hate speech, or is threatening or abusive, they should consider their powers under appropriate legislation including [The Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006](#) and [Section 5 Public Order Act](#). Such behaviour will often itself fall outside the protection afforded by the ECHR, because of the prohibition under Article 17 on conduct aimed at the destruction of rights or freedoms enjoyed by others.

In cases where the police are uncertain if an individual's behaviour falls outside the scope of Article 10, officers will need to make a decision based on the prevailing threat and risk using the [NDM](#). Where possible, legal advice should be sought in advance of any such action, although in accordance with the [Risk Principles](#), circumstances may preclude this.

Broader understanding

Whilst the ECHR affords certain protections to all individuals those protections do not extend to individuals who seek to 'abuse' their rights to the detriment of another. [Article 17](#) states 'Nothing in the convention may be interpreted as implying for any state, group or person any right to engage in any activity or perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set out in the convention.' If [Article 17](#) is considered in conjunction with the protection of the rights of others, then the threshold for police interference or restriction changes.

There are four scenarios in which this will most commonly arise:

1. Violence, or incitement to violence;
2. Hate speech and associated activity;
3. Counter-protests;
4. Deliberate interference with / prevention of the peaceful enjoyment of property.

It must be borne in mind that it is only in exceptional or extreme cases that Article 17 would apply. It should only be resorted to if it is immediately clear that protestors are relying on the Convention to engage in an activity that is clearly contrary to the values of the Convention, and which is aimed at the destruction of the rights and freedoms laid down in it. It would not apply to a protest whose collateral effect was the inconvenience or annoyance of others – in such a case a balance needs to be struck between the rights of the respective parties.

The question of hate speech has been the subject of numerous decisions in the European Court. Different countries do have different concepts as to what might constitute hate speech within the particular cultural and historical sensitivities of that country. The expression of racist ideology and religious hatred has consistently been held not to attract any protection under the Convention, for example in relation to Islamophobia in [Norwood v UK](#).

In the context of political protest, there is a difference between an expression of "radical dissatisfaction" and speech intended or likely to provoke hatred. In *Stern Taulats and Roura Capellera v. Spain* the appellants had burned a large, upside-down picture of the Spanish King and Queen. These actions had not led to

violence or disorder. The ECtHR determined that this was an exercise of the freedom of expression that was protected? under Article 17.

The scenario of the counter-protest is frequently sensitive and difficult. A distinction must be drawn between the general right to stage a counter protest, which itself attracts an equal degree of protection under the ECHR to the first protest, and a specific counter protest where the intention is (at least in part) to prevent or substantially curtail the exercise of Article 9, 10 or 11 rights by the other group. In the second scenario, Article 17 may well be engaged, as a counter protest whose aim is to frustrate the exercise of Article 9, 10 and 11 rights by others would itself not be protected by those same articles. In Plattform 'Ärzte für das Leben' v Austria, it was confirmed that “the right to counter-demonstrate cannot extend to inhibiting the exercise of the right to demonstrate”.

The final common scenario is where the intention of a group is to prevent another person from carrying out lawful (often commercial) activity.

Article 1 of the first protocol: Protection of Property gives every person the right to peaceful enjoyment of his or her possessions. This imposes a negative obligation on the state not to:

- interfere with peaceful enjoyment of property
- deprive a person of their possessions or
- subject a person’s possessions to control.

The concept of property and possessions includes tangible things like land and money but also includes leases, shares as well as contractual and statutory rights. Many lawful commercial activities will involve a person making use of their possessions or property.

Companies as well as individuals are entitled to protection. For example, a protest that blockaded the entrance to a company’s headquarters, and which prevented workers from going to work would be an interference with the company’s peaceful enjoyment of its property. An action by protestors aimed at preventing this type of lawful activity is likely to fall within the scope of Article 17. In such circumstances, the police could decide to take action to protect the rights of those affected and restrict the rights of the protesters.

The aim of the protestor in these types of cases must be carefully considered:

- If the protestors’ aim is to mount a protest, the collateral effect of which may be to interfere with the rights of others, then the lawful and appropriate response by the police will be the imposition of only those conditions and controls that are necessary and proportionate under Articles 9(2), 10(2) and 11(2).
- By contrast, if the protestors’ aim is to interfere substantially with, or prevent, another person from undertaking activity which involves the lawful use of their own property, then such activity is not protected.

The presumption in favour of peaceful assembly and expression under Articles 10 and 11 does not require that peaceful protest must always be unrestricted as to do so would not necessarily be in-line with Article 17 of the ECHR.

Based on information, intelligence and prevailing circumstance, police will need to assess if protestors’ actions are aimed at the destruction of rights and

freedoms of others even if they have not explicitly communicated this. This will directly inform the legal basis for interfering in/ restricting the protest, and the extent of any such interference. In arriving at a decision police need to be clear in their own minds whether

- as will normally be the case, they are imposing restrictions and conditions under Articles 9(2), 10(2) and 11(2), which requires a careful balancing exercise; or
- or whether the actions/intentions of the protestors are such that Article 17 applies, and the particular form of protest does not attract the protection of Articles 9, 10 and 11.

It follows that the public are entitled to expect that the police will be diligent in assessing the motivations and actions of protesters, and balancing their rights with those of others. Police will need to consider the public interest both associated with the protest and any activity it affects. In such cases, the use of [Evidence Gathering Teams](#) can provide best evidence to support subsequent legal proceedings. The use of body worn video cameras can supplement the use of Evidence Gathering Teams but should not replace them.

Impact of long-term protest

Disruption can be caused by protests in a number of ways. Some protest action may be very disruptive in the short term e.g. a protest group accessing an airport's runway is likely to have significant immediate impact on flights. Other protest action may have limited impact in the short term but, over an extended period, could cause significant impact e.g. sustained traffic disruption affecting local businesses,

employees, deliveries and customers. Hence, the peaceful nature of a protest will not mean that restrictions cannot be imposed, provided such restrictions are no more than are necessary to uphold the rights of others.

In these longer-term protests, the full scale of impact may not be instantly apparent. Where protest impacts upon others over a protracted period it is important that the police build evidence of the effect on local communities, businesses and transport networks from the start.

In cases where the protest causes a significant impact on the rights or freedoms of others, both the domestic court and the European court have confirmed that there is no legal right to protest for an indefinite duration. For example:

- In [Molnar v Hungary](#) the European Court concluded that where a mobile protest had taken place in a city centre, significantly disrupting traffic, it was a proportionate interference in the protestors' rights to bring the event to an end after 8 hours.
- In [The Mayor Commonalty and Citizens of London v Samede](#) the Court of Appeal confirmed that, notwithstanding the provisions of Articles 10 and 11, there was no right to establish a protest camp of indefinite duration on public land.


Where it is believed that an action may represent the start of protracted protest, the Silver Commander will need to ensure there's a plan governing the collection and collation of this information. Recognised practice supports a nominated individual being identified to perform this function and be ready to present it to a

court if needed. This evidence will support decisions in respect of police intervention and enforcement, including any subsequent prosecutions. It is important that this is communicated to the

protestors, so they're aware of the impact of their actions and how this may necessitate a change in the police's response.

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Information systems and processes



It is important that all pertinent
information and intelligence is
brought to the attention of the Silver
Commander.

Information systems and processes

Information management

Determining a proportionate policing response requires many different forms of information. The management of these will be performed by a number of elements of the [command structure](#) which may include:

- [Bronze Community](#)
- [Bronze Liaison](#)
- [Bronze Intelligence](#)
- Legal Adviser.

Information requirements will differ based on threat and risk, and individual [command structures](#) should reflect this. While different information will be gathered and passed through the separate Bronzes, it is important that all pertinent information and intelligence is brought to the attention of the Silver Commander.

The Silver Commander should put protocols in place at the earliest opportunity to ensure effective information and intelligence management, and to avoid any potential damage to public confidence should information be handled inappropriately.

On larger operations, the Silver Commander may require intelligence that is managed by an identified [Bronze Intelligence](#). Bronze Intelligence needs to support the Silver Commander to develop an intelligence collection plan.

Local context

Protests will impact on communities to varying degrees. This can be through their support for and involvement in action or disruption caused to their daily lives. It is therefore important that command decision making is informed by this valuable information. A [Community Impact Assessment](#) should be considered to identify how a protest impacts on a community or group within a community. Successful policing depends on engaging and communicating effectively with the communities each force serves. Developing and maintaining positive relationships is an essential part of this and should form part of everyday policing. It is not a passive process but a proactive collaboration between all the parties involved. Further guidance on [Engagement and communication](#) is available in APP.

This information will inform [strategic and tactical planning](#) and decision making. Care must be taken in the use of such information and any subsequent tasking to develop intelligence if the trust and confidence of communities is to be preserved. This will be further supported by the Silver Commander establishing [protocols](#) between the identified Bronze and those gathering community based information.

National context

Protest activity is not always limited to one location. Many protestors move nationally and in some cases, internationally, in support of their cause. This may necessitate a collection plan that links into national resources (a list of these is provided in Appendix A).

Where a force is dealing with a protest, or learns that a protest is going to take place in their area, they should make early contact with other forces who have had similar protests. This is to identify lessons learnt and build on best practice. Within their role, the [NPCC](#) protest lead can direct commanders and planning departments to forces with relevant experience.

Historical context

In determining the threat and risk around a specific protest, it is important for the Silver Commander to be aware of any historical context to the action, eg, does the action fall on the day of a religious festival or anniversary of significant interest to that cause? Similarly, the date of action may correspond to critical activities at the protest, eg, key deliveries or visitors to the location. Any such context is likely to have an impact on threat and risk and therefore may influence the scale of police response.


Social media/online content

Protest groups often utilise social media through all phases of their activity. Initially, this is often intended to galvanize support for a protest. During protest, groups may 'stream' live footage and provide updates

online. Selective posting of incidents after the event is almost inevitable. Subsequently it may be used as a forum for complaint, comment and further publicity. It is therefore important that the police consider the opportunities and risks social media presents in order to help determine the policing response. Social media is widely and easily accessible, but is not always accurate, reliable or valid. It may not be representative of the views or intentions of many of those seeking to protest, and may reflect the views of a small minority. For these reasons, it is important that Bronze Intelligence should consult a Digital Media Investigator (DMI) who can provide a digital intelligence and investigation strategy. This will support the gathering of online content ensuring it is done in a proportionate manner in accordance with [Information Management](#) and [Intelligence Management](#).

Public Order Public Safety policing often necessitates that decisions made are based on limited information and intelligence owing to the inherent risk of not taking action at the time. Where this is necessary, the decision must be taken in accordance with the [Risk Principles](#) and identified gaps in the intelligence picture recorded along with a rationale.

Working with stakeholders

A group of approximately ten people, including men and women of various ages, are seated around a long, light-colored conference table. They are dressed in business casual attire. The setting appears to be a modern office or meeting room with large windows in the background. The overall tone of the image is professional and collaborative.

A better understanding of stakeholders' aims will support the police in balancing their duties in relation to peaceful protest with the overall role of the police.

Working with stakeholders

Protests invariably involve a number of stakeholders, often with separate and conflicting aims. In maintaining a position of impartiality, the police must seek to understand these aims so that areas of potential conflict can be minimised. A better understanding of stakeholders' aims will support the police in balancing their duties in relation to peaceful protest and the other [Roles of the Police](#).

In achieving a better understanding and balance of duties, a communications strategy will need to be developed to use a variety of options most suited to engagement with each stakeholder group. Understanding the aims and influence an individual is likely to have within a stakeholder group prior to

engagement may help the Silver in developing an effective communication strategy.

The use of a communications matrix similar to the generic example below may help in the planning and operational phase. Colour can be used to identify where police consider good or adequate measures are in place to support communication but also where there are areas considered inadequate. Direct contact between all stakeholders may not be necessary or desirable in every instance. In which case, providing this lack of direct contact does not present an identified risk, the cell may be shown as green, eg, communications between stakeholder 1 and 2.

		Communication to			
		Police	Stakeholder 1	Stakeholder 2	Stakeholder 3
Communication from	Police	Command structure supported by radios, telephony and IT.	Co-location of tactical and operation command.	Police Liaison Teams Weekly update meeting by Silver Key updates by social media.	Community Bronze and neighbourhood officers Key updates by social media.
	Stakeholder 1	Co-location of tactical and operation command.	Command structure, internal comms systems including telephone, IT.	No direct communication Comms through police.	Weekly meetings with local councillors.
	Stakeholder 2	PLT and 101 / 999 services.	No direct communication Comms through police Letters.	Interpersonal and social media.	Direct interaction at protest location social media.
	Stakeholder 3	Community bronze and neighbourhood officers 101 / 999 service Letters.	Weekly meetings with local councillors Letters, telephone services.	Direct interaction at protest location.	Interpersonal and social media.

(Above: illustration of a typical communications matrix, further details included in the NPPOTC Events Module)

Good comms provision



Adequate comms provision




Poor comms provision



Protestors

The people attending protests are likely to have different backgrounds and a range of different social identities (further information on the psychology of crowds is available on all core POPS Command Modules within the NPOTTC). Their motivations, needs, capabilities and tactics will vary, as will their willingness to go beyond peaceful protest and engage in criminal activity. Some may not identify themselves as 'protestors', and use of this blanket term may lead to incorrect assumption. The police therefore need to be informed about the intentions of those attending protests in order to differentiate between groups and individuals.



The above diagram is a simplified representation that may in some situations help the police to understand where individuals sit on a spectrum of protest activity. The diagram highlights that the majority of individuals associated with most causes may be considered 'supporters'. This includes individuals who feel an affiliation to a cause but are relatively unlikely to actively protest. Supporters may be present in the vicinity

of protest, and external influences could cause them to become directly involved.

'Protestors' will also feel an affiliation with a cause but will also typically seek to express their beliefs by attending and actively taking part in protests.

Where protestors move beyond simply expressing their beliefs at protests into taking other action to further their cause, they may be considered 'activists'. A type of action, which is only part of activist behaviour, and will not be undertaken at all by some activists, is often described as 'direct action'. This often refers to unlawful conduct aimed at preventing or disrupting the activities of the subject of the protest. Sometimes its aim is to intimidate or demoralise those who undertake that activity. Examples of direct action include deliberate obstruction and criminal damage. Often, it is the activities of those activists attempting such 'direct action' that result in arrests at a protest.

Modern crowd theory (see NPOTTC) suggests that an individual's identity and behaviour during a protest may change dependent upon a number of external influences, including police action. This supports the view that some individuals may move up or down the spectrum, and that blanket terms to describe them may lead to incorrect assumptions.

Police should educate themselves regarding the individuals, groups, and groups within groups attending a protest in order to help identify a proportionate policing response. This is likely to include communication before, during and after

an event, as well as other information collected in the run up to a protest.

The diverse nature of those attending protest may require a similarly broad spectrum of communication options. Historically, some protest groups have been mistrustful of the police and this has made communication between police and these protestors challenging. The introduction of [Police Liaison Teams](#) (PLTs) and adherence to a 'no surprises approach' has gone some way to address this. Any perception that the police are seeking information in advance in order to undermine protest should be avoided.

Where the protest is community-based, the option of [Community Mediators](#) will often prove useful. Together with the use of neighbourhood policing resources, community mediators may provide a more effective communication channel with community-based groups than PLTs.

While it is recognised that a 'no surprises approach' is desirable when communicating with protestors because it can build trust and confidence, consideration must be given to sensitive information being divulged which could result in escalation of protest or criminal activity, or compromise the effectiveness of the policing response.

Public authorities

Public authorities have legal responsibilities under Section 6 of the HRA, and it is unlawful for them to act in a way that is incompatible with a Convention right. In some instances it may prove

necessary for the police to highlight this, encouraging them to develop an understanding of their obligations.

The Equality and Human Rights Commission has produced a [guide for public authorities](#) outlining their obligations under the HRA and how human rights are relevant to various roles. This may be particularly relevant in instances where local or national politics play a part in either supporting or opposing the protest.

If, despite police engagement, impasse is reached between public authorities and police regarding their legal responsibilities, the Gold Commander at strategic level should address this.

Public authorities can provide invaluable expert advice informing police decision making, e.g. planning legislation, building control and identifying land ownership. They have access to equipment and resources that may directly affect the scale of police response, e.g. barriers, lighting and stewards.

Public authorities also have powers that may be more appropriate than police powers in certain circumstances. Where possible, these should be identified in advance of any protest and [multi-agency protocols](#) agreed upon.

It may be the case that a public authority is the subject of the protest. In such cases, the impartiality of the police is likely to be questioned. Commanders must consider the [Code of Ethics](#) in managing this issue, and be scrupulous in recording their rationale to ensure openness and transparency. This may necessitate an atypical

arrangement regarding communications between authorities, e.g. avoiding co-location of tactical command.

It is likely that those responsible for managing normal day-to-day policing will have established long-term collaborative relationships with their counterparts in local public authorities. It may be wholly appropriate to utilise such contacts, but equally, if not effectively managed, this may result in damage to trust and confidence with other stakeholders.

In developing the communication strategy, the Gold Commander should consider the option of joint key messages between the police and public authorities and whether it is appropriate in each circumstance.

For the purposes of the HRA, the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) is to be regarded as a public authority. The specialist nature of protest means that, where it is foreseeable that prosecutions may follow, the CPS should be consulted well in advance of protests. It may be necessary to ensure that the CPS have been briefed in advance about any specific legal issues a protest may generate that they may not routinely encounter. This will support the development of plans regarding police intervention as well as providing valuable detail which may feed into the communications strategy. This will support open and transparent communications with other stakeholders. For long-term protests, it is very likely to be beneficial to identify a single point of contact within the CPS who will support an informed, consistent

approach to prosecutions should they become necessary.

Subject of protest

There is often a specific subject of protest whether that is an individual, business, location or community. It is important to recognise the impact that targeted protest can have and consider this in determining a proportionate policing response.

The individual

Where individuals are subject to protest, the police must consider any additional impact on their Human Rights and those of their family and associates. Specifically, the police should consider Protocol 1, Article 1: Peaceful Enjoyment of Property of the HRA, Article 8: Right to Private and Family Life of the ECHR (see Striking the Balance), and the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 – see Appendix B for Human Rights case law. It is important to note that Article 11: Freedom of Assembly and Association does not grant an unlimited freedom of choice as to the forum for the exercise of that right. This means that protestors will not always have the right to choose the location for their protest. Restrictions may be appropriate, particularly where a protest is centred on an individual's home or near their property. Article 11 is therefore a 'qualified right'; it can be lawfully interfered with if it is in the interest of public safety, the prevention of crime or disorder, or the protection of the rights and

freedoms of others. Where an individual is subject to prolonged protest action, police and statutory agencies should conduct a joint risk assessment of the impact of the protest on the individual's wellbeing, and that of any family and associates subject to the same.

Commercial business

Businesses can be subject to protest. The effects of prolonged or direct action can have significant financial implications if proportionate mitigation is not put in place.

Commercial businesses are required under [health and safety law](#) to provide their employees with a safe working environment. A business being the subject of a protest does not absolve it of this legal requirement but may necessitate the business putting in place additional mitigation for safeguarding purposes. Where threats arising from protest fall beyond the capability of the private sector, the police and other public authorities may need to consider applying resources.

While the police are not legally obliged to ensure that companies are able to undertake lawful activity unimpeded, they must consider their [duties in relation to policing protest](#) and the [Role of the Police](#). This will require a proportionate policing response based on threat and risk assessment. While in some instances commercial businesses may not consider the policing response sufficient, the decision to deploy police resources

and the scale of any deployment remains that of individual chief officers.

Where there are likely to be financial implications for businesses, it is essential that any decision relating to policing be documented in an auditable way. Forces may wish to seek legal advice to further inform their decision-making process.

In appropriately mitigating identified threats, the police and other public authorities will at times need to have regular contact / communication with commercial businesses. This is necessary to ensure there's a common understanding of each other's perspective, roles, responsibilities and a sufficient knowledge of working practices to support a safe and effective policing response if required. Forces may wish to commit their understanding of these arrangements in a [Memorandum of Understanding \(MOU\)](#). It is likely that agreement will also need to be reached on [information handling](#) between the business and the police.

In having regular contact/communications with commercial businesses, it is important that the police do not compromise their position of impartiality. Forces should ensure communications between the police and all stakeholders are open, transparent and auditable wherever possible.

Commercial businesses may seek civil injunctions to resolve issues associated with prolonged or reoccurring protest. Again, it is important that the police remain impartial in any application for injunctions. If an injunction is issued, it is essential that the police are fully sighted on its content and

the businesses' expectations are managed with regard to its implementation. The injunction will very rarely impose specific duties on the police regarding enforcement, and an assertion that it does so will have to be considered critically. If this were indeed the case, the police would normally have a right to go back to the judge granting an injunction that imposed specific duties or obligations on them. The terms and scope of the injunction and any implications for the policing operation must be contained within the Tactical Plan, which will need to be communicated clearly to officers deployed onto the operation.

It is important to understand injunctions, whether or not they impose specific duties on the police. For example, it may be a relevant factor for an officer to consider when deciding if an arrest is necessary.

Public authorities/state

Public authorities may become subject to protest for a number of reasons. This may be associated with local issues such as planning new development or reductions in local services. Equally for many, they represent the wider 'state' and provide a local focal point for protest relating to national issues.

In determining a balanced policing approach to protests of this kind, it is important for the police to recognise that an individual's right to protest against the 'state' is essential in a democratic society. This was explored in [Kuznetsov v Russia](#). The ECtHR held that there had been a violation of

Article 11 of the Convention, interpreted in the light of Article 10: Freedom of Expression.

With any such protest, it becomes ever more important that police maintain a position of impartiality. This may be difficult when one considers the likelihood of longstanding working relations between the police and other public authorities. This should be supported by transparent, auditable communications.

Other protest groups

Often, a protest will attract the attention of individuals with opposing views who will choose to 'counter-protest'. Assuming that both groups act peacefully and not with the aim of destroying the rights of the opposing group, police must recognise that both are exercising their [Article 9](#) rights through actions drawing upon [Articles 10 and 11](#). The counter-protestors has an equal right to stage their own protest, but has **no** right to seek to obstruct or disrupt the other group's protest. The point at which one person's actions become sufficiently interfering in the rights of another to necessitate restriction by police will need to be considered and the rationale recorded. In seeking to balance competing interests, and uphold, so far as is practicable, both sides' right to protest, it is important that the police avoid decisions that give or are perceived to give a preference to one group over another.

Community

The Oxford English Dictionary defines 'community' as 'all the people who live in a particular area or place or having a particular characteristic in common'. This broad definition may have value when considering the stakeholders whose rights may be affected during protest.

While some protests will be directed against a particular community, other protests will aim to raise awareness of a cause in a community by intentionally or unintentionally causing disruption. The impact of disruptive protest on a community will vary and is not always foreseeable or initially

apparent. Therefore it is important that the [Communications Plan](#) has provision for ongoing liaison with all elements of the community, and where appropriate, evidence of disruption and the impact of protest is captured in impact statements. Capturing the impact of protest on communities can inform future communications with protestors. Protestors may decide to alter their approach to reduce its impact. Alternatively, in those cases where the impact and disruption caused may be what some protestors intend, the process of capturing and communicating impact is likely to inform police decision making and support any subsequent police intervention.

Command, planning and tactics



The use of occupationally and operationally competent POPS Commanders and POPSAs is a key element in effectively policing protest.

Command, planning and tactics

Command

Forces may decide, having conducted an appropriate threat and risk assessment, that a protest does not require the deployment of dedicated police resources or a command structure. In all instances this initial assessment must be made by a trained and competent POPS Commander. Equally, some protests can, owing to their scale and nature, present a risk of public disorder or to public safety. In these instances, as with other POPS events, this requires that any police [command structure](#) put in place should be appropriately trained under the NPPOTC.

The NPCC considers that the use of occupationally and operationally competent POPS Commanders and POPSAs is a key element in effectively policing protest. Their use supports the need for those in command to have a good understanding of Human Rights legislation and its application in complex circumstances. Experienced POPS commanders and POPSAs have knowledge, understanding and skills which allow them to plan to reduce risk in such situations but are also well-placed to respond appropriately if instances of disruption or disorder do develop. This flexibility to respond appropriately may be lost where forces consider using commanders who are not trained under the NPPOTC for 'lower risk' protests.

Protests may require command structures which include specialist non-accredited command roles such as Community Bronze or Roads Policing Bronze. In the absence of formal training, the Silver Commander is likely to need to identify [command protocols](#) to achieve an effective command structure which is commensurate to identified threat and risk.

In relation to long-term protest, forces may wish to consider identifying POPS commanders and POPSAs who can be deployed on the operation for a significant period. An important benefit of this is that it helps achieve a consistent approach that is understood by all stakeholders and police. Where it becomes necessary to replace members of the command structure, cognisance should be given to command continuity elsewhere in the command structure. Commanders and POPSAs joining a long-term operation should receive a detailed briefing/handover regarding the operation.

Planning

The planning processes taught on the NPPOTC support forces in adhering to the [Use of Force Principles](#) and promote that command decisions are documented in an auditable way. The production of a [Strategy](#), [Tactical Plan](#), [Operational Plans and Command Decision Logs](#) will provide those working protest operations with clear direction and promote both consistency and transparency. Freedom of Information requests are regularly made in relation to the policing of protest and these documents will

support forces in accounting for their actions. Further to this, there may be potential for prosecutions and enquiries, meaning commanders will need to ensure that plans, decision logs and associated communications are clearly recorded and securely retained. For long-term protests, forces should establish a planning group to identify staff, resources and finance, thereby supporting the command structure. If this approach is adopted, forces should also consider the wellbeing of staff deployed on long-term protest and this may necessitate the appointment of a welfare officer. Welfare may also extend to providing dedicated representation from the following:

- Police Federation / staff associations
- Force Welfare Departments / provisions
- Human resources
- Police standards / complaints

Tactics

As protests present huge variance in terms of the level and nature of threat, commanders must consider a broad spectrum of [Tactical Options](#) to mitigate these. While consideration should be given to all available tactical options based on their proportionality and availability, particular reference to the following sections of APP is advised:

[Police Liaison Team](#) (PLT)

Police Liaison Teams were introduced to provide a communications conduit between police command and 'hard to reach' groups. Operational learning at recent protests has shown

that it is important that national guidance on their use is adhered to if trust and confidence is to be maintained. Forces must consider the welfare of those liaison officers deployed at long-term protests with regard to both emotional and physical wellbeing.

[Forward Intelligence Teams](#) (FIT) and [Deployment of Forward Intelligence Teams](#)

FIT may be effective in identification and engagement with individuals who may become involved in, or encourage, disorder or violence, or may increase levels of tension. Commanders should consider the tasking of FIT and potential impact on the [policing style and tone](#).

[Evidence Gathering Teams](#) (EGT) and [taking and retaining photographic images](#)

Operational learning has identified that in addition to recording the issuing of formal warnings, consideration should be given to recording appeals processes. The use of EGT to record a state of normality in advance of, during and after protest will offer context regarding any potential impact of protestor action in addition to obtaining evidence of any offences. EGT will also provide useful evidence in relation to the conduct of stakeholders and the police during the protest. The retention of images and records of protestors' attendance at protests has the potential to infringe their rights, particularly in circumstances of entirely peaceful, lawful protest (see [Catt v UK](#) and [Wood v Commissioner of Police](#)).

[Protestor Removal Teams](#) (PRT)

Some activists employ 'lock-on' tactics which may require the deployment of specialist trained officers and equipment in accordance with the training provided under the NPPOTC. Operational learning from recent protests suggests that police should consider capacity and capability both at force level and as a region to deploy such teams. It may be necessary, based on threat and risk, to have teams of these officers on standby with equipment already prepared.

[Public Order Medics](#)

In recognising that some protests present a risk of public disorder or to public safety, the provision of

public order medics should be considered to provide immediate medical support to officers, protestors and other stakeholders.

[Community Mediators](#)

It is likely that communities will be key stakeholders in any protest. The identification and cooperation of individuals within a community, who have influence or authority, has the potential to support the communication strategy and is likely to be a consideration on protest operations. The Silver (Tactical) Commander needs to consider the benefit versus the risk of utilising community mediators as highlighted in APP.

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Vulnerability at protests

The presence of vulnerable persons at a protest must inform police decision making.

Vulnerability at protests

The College of Policing's definition of vulnerability states that: "A person is vulnerable if, as a result of their situation or circumstances, they're unable to take care of or protect themselves or others from harm or exploitation."

It is important that police and other statutory agencies seek to make themselves aware of people who may become vulnerable at protests. As previously highlighted, the right to Freedom of Expression can include conduct, ideas and opinions that can shock, offend, disturb and irritate. In extreme cases, protests can escalate into violence or direct action which could endanger the protesters themselves or others. For these reasons. Where concerns are identified action may fall to the police or other stakeholders such as Children's Services. In either case, the presence of vulnerable persons at a protest must inform police decision making. An awareness of the make-up of a crowd will support a wider consideration of the application of appropriate [Tactical Options](#) and contingencies.

Safeguarding children and young people

[Working together to safeguard children 2015](#)

There is a legal obligation on police commanders to carry out their functions in a way that takes account of the need to safeguard and promote the welfare of children (see [Castle v Commissioner of Police](#)). Police commanders should promote safeguarding as a priority to protest organisers, and where appropriate, signpost additional support from other agencies. Where safeguarding is not being prioritised, the police service must ensure everything that is legally possible is done to redress the situation.

Where the police are aware that there's the prospect of children attending a particular protest, there will be a specific duty on them to consider this when planning the operation. The [NSPCC](#), offers guidance and advice for organisations needing any assistance in writing and implementing a safeguarding policy.

Working with other vulnerable groups

Where appropriate, planners and commanders should refer to specific police guidance within APP on [mental health](#) and [learning disabilities](#).

Further practical information relating to individuals with disabilities is available from the disability equality charity [Scope](#).

Protective security

Account must be taken of the prevailing national threat assessment, with the event-specific and national threat levels informing decision making.

Protective security

Protests often draw large numbers of individuals into one location. This, combined with the presence of police officers, may represent a potential target for a terrorist attack. Police should assess the need to mitigate any such threat which is considered reasonably foreseeable from international or domestic terrorism and/or violent extremism.

In relation to protective security, police commanders and planners should consider the following actions/factors at an early stage:

[Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre \(JTAC\)](#) threat assessment should be obtained via local Special Branch (SB or equivalent) to inform present and future strategic decision making and tactical planning. Account must also be taken of the prevailing national threat assessment, with the event-specific and national threat levels informing decision making.

Consider early appointment of a CT Security Coordinator (CT SecCo). The Gold / Strategic Commander MUST consider appointment of a CT SecCo in a number of circumstances, one of which is crowded places. Further guidance on the appointment of a CT SecCo is available via the secure APP website (pnn email address required).

The role of a CT SecCo includes:

- Developing a security plan with a view to minimising threat, managing vulnerability and, therefore, mitigating risk.
- In respect of policing protests - supporting Gold's strategy.

- Coordinating all aspects of protective security by looking at a protest holistically from a CT perspective.
- Using an in depth knowledge and awareness of a range of security assets and their operational deployment to:
 - target harden
 - reduce vulnerability
 - lessen risk.
- Implementing multi-agency protective security measures with the organisers and other partner agencies via the multi-agency planning process and/or Safety Advisory Group.
- Explore opportunities for organisers to help and support protective security, for example, through promotion of the [Action Counters Terrorism campaign](#).
- Ensuring staff involved in policing the event are briefed on any threat and have relevant information available to them, for example,
 - NPCC/College of Policing 'Terrorism Response: Aide Memoir' (restricted access, available from secure APP web site).
 - STA (See, Tell, Act) safe principles for officers should be applied.
 - **See:** what is happening and where
 - **Tell:** communicate, describe incident/type of weapon
 - **Act:** stay safe, update, observe/contain
- Ensuring police commanders and planners are aware of relevant counter terrorism command and control functions/structures

contained within 'NPCC (2015) Command, Control and Coordination of Major CT Operations' (restricted access via secure APP web-site).

- Work together with the organiser and other partners to implement [National Counter Terrorism Security Office \(NaCTSO\)](#) guidance in relation to [crowded places](#). This work should also include consideration regarding the development of protocols relevant to the environment and the role of the protest organiser and that of the police.
 - The implementation of NaCTSO [Run, Hide, Tell](#) guidance is relevant to public places and large open spaces.
 - Consultation with regional protect/prepare leads/teams and Counter Terrorism Security Advisors (CTSA's) will support the development of these protocols.

The appointment of a CT SecCo will potentially lead to a requirement for further specialist resources to be deployed including: Police Search Coordinator (PoISC),

Police Search Adviser (PoISA) and other layers of search resources including specialists Licensed Search Officers (LSO). This can represent deployment of significant resources to complete, pre event search & seal operations, event search regimes on entry and enduring search throughout the event. The impact of this in terms of operational demand and costs therefore require consideration.

Other invaluable guidance can be found through the [NacTSO web-site](#) (which is primarily aimed at the public, businesses and event organisers), [NPCC – National, Counter Terrorism Policing HQ](#) and [National CT Policing web site \(only available from a PNN enabled account\)](#) (which are aimed at the police service) and should be seen as the gateway to a range of tactics, advice and products available to businesses, event organisers and the police.

Costs

It is widely recognised that the policing of protests will typically fall within the core role of the police.

Costs

Unlike the issue of policing costs at events which are explored in the [NPCC Event Policing Operational Advice Document](#), it is widely recognised that the policing of protests will typically fall within the core role of the police. Therefore costs attributable to core police duties should not be sought from those organising or taking part in protests.

However, it is important that the cost of policing protest is accurately recorded in order to provide transparency if freedom of information requests (FOI) are made and in support of any potential claim for a special grant made by a force to the Home Office.

Large-scale protests may additionally require the provision of stewarding, barriers, additional signage and other provision consistent with any large-scale event. These costs are likely to sit with the organiser or other stakeholders. Should a disagreement around costs arise, forces should refer to the [National Policing Guidelines on Charging for Police Services](#) published by NPCC and may wish to seek legal advice.

Financial control and governance

An early awareness and recognition that an event may become protracted will allow commanders to plan accordingly. Regular resourcing meetings can be held to review demand and resourcing levels. Similarly, regular reviews of information and intelligence, supported by frequent contact between commanders, should ensure the appropriateness of resourcing levels. A regular finance report will promote compliance with any agreed costings.

Where an operation will become protracted, identifying a dedicated planning team could ensure consistency and may make it easier to vary resources at short notice.

External liaison

Maintaining relationships and regular contact with stakeholders is essential in identifying likely milestones and events that will attract increased activity and attention.

Where significant additional costs are expected to be incurred, there may be the potential to seek special grant funding from the Home Office, providing specific criteria can be met. The bid must be made by the Police and Crime Commissioner. Forces are expected to meet the additional cost of any event up to one per cent of the force's budget.

[Special grant guidance](#) can be found on the Home Office website and sets out the information that a PCC should include in their application.

Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services conducts an independent review of the application to assess whether costs are reasonable and proportionate, and forces should be in a position to evidence that these costs represent value for money.

Notwithstanding any potential bid, there is a requirement to manage costs for all events and the following are examples of interventions/controls that could be considered:

Overtime management

- Schedule teams so that they do not attract enhanced rest day payments (as a result of being on rest day the previous day).
- Stagger deployments according to the pattern of demand throughout the day.
- Release officers as appropriate/necessary.
- Where appropriate, agree a protocol with contractors to avoid weekend and bank holiday deployments.

Use of partner agencies

Consider the use of partner agencies (via SCG) to provide services and facilities at a zero cost option rather than pay such as:

- Accommodation
- Traffic management

- Training

As well as following, the normal procurement rules consider low cost options such as:

- Other forces.
- Other emergency services (often at zero cost).

Equipment

As well as following, the normal procurement rules consider low cost options such as:

- Other forces.
- Pre-owned equipment.
- Other emergency services (often at zero cost).

Appendix A: National Contacts

National points of contact

National Police Chiefs' Council (NPCC)

National Police Coordination Centre (NPoCC)

College of Policing – Public Order Public Safety Unit

CTP-NOC

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Appendix B: Human Rights Articles and Case Law

Absolute	Commonly applies to	Key case law
Article 2	Right to life: Safety, use of force, protection of people/communities, use of PPE	McCann v UK 27 September 1995 , Series A no. 324 Güleç v Turkey (1999) 28 E.H.R.R. 121
Article 3	Prohibition of torture / inhumane degrading treatment: Containment, use of force, protection from actions of third party linked to the Human Rights Act section 6	Gafgen v Germany (2011) 52 E.H.R.R. 1 Bouyid v Belgium (2016) 62 E.H.R.R. 32
Limited	Commonly applies to	
Article 5	Right to liberty and security: Arrest strategy, linked with containment	Austin v UK (2012) 55 E.H.R.R. 14 Eiseman-Renyard v United Kingdom (2019) Application No. Application no. 57884/17
Qualified	Commonly applies to	
Article 6	Right to a fair trial: Investigation, disclosure, file preparation, court proceedings, a challenge to the imposition of restrictions on assemblies without prior court order	O'Neill and Lauchlan v UK (2016) ECHR 583 Gallastegui v Westminster City Council (2013) EWCA Civ 28
Article 8	Right to private and family life: Searching, Overt Photography, community issues, home	Catt v United Kingdom (43514/15) R (DB) v PSNI (2017) UKSC 7 Wood v Commissioner of Police (2009) EWCA Civ 414
Article 9	Freedom of thought, consciousness and religion: Individuals' <u>beliefs</u> (which may include religion, politics, sexuality, veganism etc.) cannot be interfered with by Public Authorities. Restrictions may only apply to the manifestation of such beliefs.	Arrowsmith v UK (1981) 3 E.H.R.R. 218 Othman v The English National Resistance (2013) EWHC 1421 (QB)
Article 10	Freedom of expression: Protection extends to actions or representations which may include examples which Shock, Offend, Disturb, Irritate, provided that in doing so the rights of others are not infringed	Redmond-Bate v DPP (2000) H.R.L.R. 249 Handyside v UK (1979-80) 1 E.H.R.R. 737 Laporte v CC Gloucestershire (2007) 2 A.C. 105

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<p>Article 11</p>	<p>Peaceful association and assembly in a public place: Static protests, marches or more general gatherings including sporting events</p>	<p>Laporte v CC Gloucestershire (2007) 2 A.C. 105 James v DPP [2015] EWHC 3296 (Admin) Molnar v Hungary (Application no. 22592/02) Balçık and Others v. Turkey Application no. 25/02 Kuznetsov v Russia (Application No. 10877/04)</p>
<p>Other Commonly applies to</p>		
<p>Article 14</p>	<p>Prohibition of discrimination: Any instance where a human right is breached on the basis of discrimination</p>	<p>See also section 29 of the Equality Act 2010</p>
<p>Article 17</p>	<p>Prohibition of abuse of rights: Nothing in the convention may be interpreted as implying for any state, group or person any right to engage in any activity or perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set out in the convention</p>	<p>Norwood v UK (2005) 40 E.H.R.R. SE11 Glimmerveen v The Netherlands (1982) 4 E.H.R.R. 260 Roj TV A/S v. Denmark (2018) 67 E.H.R.R. SE8 Pavel Ivanov v. Russia 35222/04</p>

Glossary

APP – Authorised Professional Practice

CPS – Crown Prosecution Service

ECHR – European Convention on Human Rights

EGT – Evidence Gathering Teams

FIT – Forward Intelligence Teams

FOI – Freedom of Information

HMICFRS – Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services

JTAC – Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre

MOU – Memorandum of Understanding

NDM – National Decision Model

NPCC – National Police Chiefs' Council

NPPOTC - National Police Public Order Training Curriculum

PLTs – Police Liaison Teams

POPS Commanders - Public Order Public Safety Commanders

POPAs - Public Order Public Safety Advisors

PRT – Protest Removal Teams

SAG – Safety Advisory Group