時論廣場》萊豬過關 拜登仍會對臺灣下「臨時禁制令」（方恩格 RossFeingold）

蔡英文接見美國聯邦衆議院退伍軍人事務委員會主席高野訪問團。（總統府提供）

美國的法律制度中，有一個法律名詞叫做「臨時禁制令」（temporary restraining order, TRO）的特殊命令，這是由法官所簽發、在特定時間範圍內施行或阻止某行動的法律程序。通常法官必須在特殊前提之下（如被告可能做出的某項行爲會造成不可修復的傷害）才能發出這道臨時禁制令。而最近幾個月，拜登政府則看似也對臺灣發出了一些「臨時禁制令」。

在「臺北經濟文化辦事處」欲更名爲「臺灣代表處」這件事情上，拜登政府似乎就對臺灣政府發出了「臨時禁制令」。由於拜登總統在擔任參議員期間有參與《臺灣關係法》的立法過程，很熟悉臺美之間來往的語彙，拜登政府並未同意讓「臺灣」取代「臺北」辦事處，這點並不令人意外。拜登政府儘量避免與中國在氣候變遷，以及伊朗核武協議等議題合作上，增加不必要的要素來激怒中國，也不足爲奇。今年年初臺灣企圖在蓋亞那設立「臺灣辦公室」未果之後，臺灣政府只好在立陶宛設立「臺灣代表處」。

「民主峰會」則是拜登政府對臺灣發出「臨時禁制令」的另一明顯例子。數月來各方猜測，蔡英文總統是否親自或透過視訊出席會議，但拜登政府最終並未邀請她。政務委員唐鳳和駐美代表蕭美琴代表臺灣雖是當之無愧，但仍埋下了在以後的類似場合，臺灣政府將不會由總統出席的隱憂。

儘管美國商務部、國防部、國務院及貿易代表處的高階政府官員在2022下半年度安排多次訪問韓國、日本和東南亞等國，但拜登政府並沒有訪問臺灣的計劃。在川普政府任期的最後幾個月，訪臺的美國政府官員則有衛生和公共服務部部長阿札爾（Alex Azar）和主管經濟、能源和環境事務的國務次卿克拉奇（Keith Krach）。川普任期最後一週，駐聯合國大使克拉芙特（Kelly Craft）原訂訪臺，卻在最後一刻取消。這是很好的提醒：《臺灣旅行法》與此類訪問是否成行無關，因爲外交政策的決策權通常屬於總統，並不能由美國國會單方面決定。拜登政府沒有訪臺計劃，基本上是拜登總統的決定，而有鑑於這種外交突破的訪問會爲臺灣帶來可觀的國外公關價值，牽制住訪臺此事，似乎是拜登政府對臺灣施加「臨時禁制令」的手段之一。

儘管如此，蔡英文政府與拜登政府的關係仍是不錯的，臺灣其他政黨也就只有乾瞪眼嫉妒的份。國民黨兩岸政策以及對禁止進口萊豬公投的支持，爲其改善與美國會議員及拜登政府的關係造成了巨大阻礙。而民衆黨和臺北市市長柯文哲在兩岸、國防和其他議題上的政策立場，到目前爲止，對美國的利害相關人來說都是懵懂不清。朱立倫和柯文哲將於2022年訪美，但也不太可能改變蔡政府所受到的華府善意，也不太可能從而得到華府對國民黨和民衆黨的善意。

放眼2022年，首先，即使反萊豬進口公投未過關，也不一定保證臺美雙邊貿易交流會立刻突飛猛進。此外，要是美政府接下來未邀請臺灣參加環太平洋軍事演習，或者針對未來蔡總統或副總統賴清德可能訪問中美洲或加勒比海過境美國的行程中，哪些公開活動是獲准進行的、哪些是不准許的，後者可以說是名符其實拜登政府可能對臺實施的「臨時禁制令」手段。

順帶一提，拜登政府如何應對副總統賴清德這位尋求民進黨提名的下屆總統候選人，任何對他提供的過境待遇或期待在美的活動安排，都將會十分敏感，美國如何對之釋出友善，卻又不明顯表示爲特定人物背書，將會是一有趣的觀察點。

美國對臺某些動作發出「臨時禁制令」，在於告訴臺灣並無法從良好的臺美雙邊關係中向美國予取予求。或者更正面一點來看，美國把臺灣視作一個正常的國家，而不是一個應該要給予特殊待遇的國家。希望臺灣政治人物在接下來與美國打交道時，能抱持着這樣的底氣。

（作者爲前美國共和黨亞太區主席）

英文全文：

Did the Biden Administration Issue Taiwan a Temporary Restraining Order in 2021?

By Ross Darrell Feingold

Former Asia Chairman, Republicans Abroad

Twitter: @RossFeingold

In some legal systems, including in the United States, a "temporary restraining order" （TRO） is a legal document issued by a judge that forces or prevents an action for a specified time frame. Usually, specific criteria must be present for a judge to issue a TRO, such as the likelihood of irreparable harm. Did the Biden Administration place a TRO on Taiwan in recent months?

Certainly, for the proposed name change of the Taipei Economic and Cultural Office （TECRO） to Taiwan Representative Office （TRO）, the Biden Administration placed a TRO on Taiwan. President Joe Biden, as a Senator, was "present at the creation" of the Taiwan Relations Act. His reluctance to replace "Taipei" with "Taiwan" in the office name is not a surprise, nor is it a surprise if his view is that this would unnecessarily provoke China at a time when the Biden Administration seeks to cooperate with China on climate change and the Iran nuclear weapons program among other issues. Taiwan had to settle for a "Taiwanese Representative Office" in Lithuania, after the failed effort earlier in the year to open a "Taiwan Office" in Guyana.

The Summit for Democracy is another obvious example of a TRO the Biden Administration placed on Taiwan. Despite months of speculation about the possibility President Tsai Ing-wen would attend in person or via video conference, the Biden Administration did not invite her. Minister Without Portfolio Audrey Tang and Representative to the United States Hsiao Bi-khim were worthy representative for Taiwan, though the danger is that if this event occurs again, the precedent is that Taiwan will not be represented by its president.

Despite numerous visits to Korea, Japan and Southeast Asia in the second half of 2022 by senior United States government officials from the Commerce Department, Defense Department, State Department, and the United States Trade Representative, no such visit to Taiwan has occurred during the Biden Administration. In the final months of the Trump Administration, US government officials who visited Taiwan included the Secretary of Health and Human Services Alex Azar, and Under Secretary of State for Economic Growth, Energy, and the Environment Keith Krach. The visit of Ambassador to the United Nations Kelly Craft in the final week of the Trump Administration was planned but cancelled at the last minute. This is a good reminder that the Taiwan Travel Act is irrelevant to whether or not such visits occur, as foreign policy decision making authority generally is the President's and cannot be dictated by the United States Congress. The absence of such visitors from the Biden Administration is a decision made for the most part by President Biden, and, given the enormous domestic and global public relations value for Taiwan that is gained from such break through visits, withholding it from Taiwan appears to be one way the Biden Administration has placed a TRO on Taiwan.

Of course, notwithstanding the above, relations between the Tsai Administration and Biden Administration are fine, and Taiwan's other political parties can only look on with envy. The Kuomintang's China policy, and its support for the referendum to prohibit the import of pork with ractopamine, creates enormous hurdles for it to improve its relations with Members of the United States Congress as well as the Biden （or the next） Administration. The Taiwan People's Party and Taipei City Mayor Ko Wen-je, and its policies on China, defense, and other issues, as of now are a mystery to stakeholders in the United States. Visits to the United States in 2022 by Kuomintang Chairman Eric Chu and Taiwan People's Party Chairman Ko Wen-je are unlikely to change the enormous amount of goodwill the Tsai Administration has in Washington DC or gain goodwill towards the Kuomintang and Taiwan People's Party.

In 2022, items on which the Biden Administration might place a TRO on Taiwan include resumption of trade negotiations notwithstanding the result of the ractopamine pork referendum, denying Taiwan an invitation to the RIMPAC exercise, or the nature of public activities in the United States should President Tsai or Vice President William Lai transit the United States on their way to or from Central American or the Caribbean. As a potential candidate for the Democratic Progressive Party's nomination for president in 2024, how the Biden Administration handles a stopover in the United States by Vice President Lai will be just as interesting to watch as a stopover by President Tsai.

The "TRO" on some items notwithstanding, otherwise good bilateral relations indicates that Taiwan will not be able to obtain all that it wants from the United States. Or in other words, the United States treats Taiwan as a normal country rather than a country that deserves special treatment. Hopefully Taiwan's politicians will keep this in mind when dealing with the United States in 2022 or afterwards.